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A new technique utilizing Scalar Quantization is designed in this paper in order to be used for Digital ImageWatermarking (DIW).
Efficiency of the technique is measured in terms of distortions of the original image and robustness under different kinds of attacks,
with particular focus on Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and Gain Attack (GA). The proposed technique performance is
affirmed by comparing with state-of-the-art methods including Quantization Index Modulation (QIM), Distortion Compensated
QIM (DC-QIM), and Rational Dither Modulation (RDM). Considerable improvements demonstrated by the method are due
to a new form of distribution of quantized samples and a procedure that recovers a watermark after GA. In contrast to other
known quantization methods, the detailed method here stipulates asymmetric distribution of quantized samples. This creates a
distinctive feature and is expressed numerically by one of the proposed criteria. In addition, several realizations of quantization
are considered and explained using a concept of Initial Data Loss (IDL) which helps to reduce watermarking distortions. The
procedure for GA recovery exploits one of the two criteria of asymmetry. The accomplishments of the procedure are due to its
simplicity, computational lightness, and sufficient precision of estimation of unknown gain factor.
1. Introduction
In modern communications, multimedia plays significant
role. Ownership ofmultimedia data is important and needs to
be protected [1]. As a part of nowadays popular multimedia
content, digital images are an important class. A protection
of digital rights of an owner is implemented by Digital Image
Watermarking (DIW). A watermark that is inserted into an
image has to be robust [2] as well as invisible [3].
Among the popular and efficient techniques in DIW,
Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) is widely used in
blind watermarking where neither original media nor water-
mark is known to the receiver [4, 5]. One of the aspects of
robustness of QIM is evaluated by attacking a watermarked
image with AdditiveWhite Gaussian Noise (AWGN). Unfor-
tunately, all the known on practice implementations of QIM
are far from achieving the channel capacity limit that was first
derived in [6].
Several different QIM-related approaches are known.
Some state-of-the-art realizations will be outlined briefly.
According to QIM, intervals of equal length Δ are mapped
on the real number line. The oldest known approach is to
replace all the original coefficients inside every interval with
one of the two endpoints of that interval. The selection
of the endpoint depends on a bit of a watermark [7]. The
main disadvantage is that for high intensity of noise and the
capacity of the oldest QIM is much lower than the theoretical
limit. In amore advanced realization ofDC-QIM, coefficients
from every original interval are mapped into two disjoint
subintervals. The gap between the subintervals is controlled
by parameter 𝛼, 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 [8]. Assuming that initial dis-
tribution inside original interval and target distributions in
subintervals are uniform, the mapping in accordance to DC-
QIM is optimal in terms of Mean Square Error (MSE) of
quantization. In order to maximize capacity for a given MSE
under AWGN of different intensity, parameters Δ, 𝛼 have to
be adjusted. Nevertheless, the limit defined in [6] is still well
above the one achievable by DC-QIM.
Not all the original coefficients in each interval need to
be quantized. This idea has been explored by the authors
of Forbidden Zone Data Hiding (FZDH) [9]. Another idea
was proposed by the authors of Thresholded Constellation
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Modulation (TCM) that uses two different quantization rules
to modify coefficients inside the original interval [10].
Despite sufficient robustness of QIM under AWGN,
the limitation is that synchronization is required in order
to reconstruct intervals that are necessary to extract (or
decode) a watermark. A type of distortion which scales all
the watermarked coefficients is called Gain Attack (GA).
The scaling factor might be close to 1 and cause very little
visual distortion, but it is unknown to the receiver which
causes asynchronous extraction. Retrieval of the watermark
is usually complicated by AWGN that follows GA [11].
Improvement of QIM performance under GA is the task
of numerous known approaches [12]. Most of them can be
classified into two groups where the main idea of the first
group is to estimate the unknown factor [13] while the idea of
the second is to quantize coefficients of a different kind that
are invariant to scaling of original signal.
The solution proposed in [11] contributes to robustness
enhancement in case of GA and a constant offset attack
followed by AWGN. A pilot signal is embedded for this pur-
pose. Fourier analysis is used during extraction to estimate
the gain factor and the offset. Another method of recovery
after GA and AWGN is proposed in [14]. It uses information
about dither sequence and applies Maximum Likelihood
(ML) procedure to estimate the scaling factor.
Watermarking that is invariant to GA demands more
complex transform of original signal (e.g., nonlinear) to
obtain coefficients. One of the most popular watermarking
methods in that category is Rational Dither Modulation
(RDM) [15]. For a particular coefficient, a ratio that depends
on a norm of other coefficients is being quantized instead of a
coefficient itself. In order to quantize the ratio, RDM utilizes
the simplest QIM scheme. This implies that the performance
of RDM under AWGN (without GA) is close to the simplest
QIM. Among others recent blind watermarking methods
robust to GA are, for example, detailed in [16–18].
A new scalar QIM-based watermarking method is pro-
posed in this paper. It provides high robustness under
conditions of AWGN andGA. Among the new features of the
method are IDL and a new form of distribution of quantized
samples.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows.
Section 2 explains the choice of the distribution of quan-
tized samples and contains description of the procedure of
recovery after GA. Concept of IDL and quantization model
are described in Section 3 using formal logic approach. The
aspects of analytic-based estimation of robustness under
AWGN are discussed in Section 4. Next, Section 5 contains
experimental results obtained under AWGN and GA. Dis-
cussion of the details of the experiment and comparison of
the performance are given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
the paper. The list of the key variables and their meaning is
given in Nomenclature section.
2. Distribution of Quantized Samples and
Procedure for Recovery after GA
An asymmetric distribution of quantized samples is proposed
and parametrized in this section. Asymmetry is the quality
that can be easily expressed quantitatively. Under symmetric
attack, like AWGN, such quantitative index remains suffi-
ciently indicative. On the other hand, it can be affected by
GA. Such semifragility is favorable for restoration of the
right condition for decoding. The restoration is done by
the procedure for recovery after GA which uses criterion of
asymmetry. Compared to the known estimation procedures
[14], the one proposed in this section depends on a single
variable which is the unknown gain factor. This makes the
technique simple and more precise.
For encoding, in our case, asymmetric distribution re-
quires substantially more variables for description compared
to common QIM methods. Because of that, it is advisable to
refer to Nomenclature section.
2.1. Distribution of Quantized Samples. SymbolΣwill be used
to denote a random variable whose domain is the space of
original coefficients of a host. A particular realization of Σ
will be denoted as 𝜍. We will further consider manipulation
of original values 𝜍 that are in some 𝑘th interval of size Δ
and its left endpoint is 𝑙𝑘
Δ
. Such an interval is referred further
as embedding interval. For any 𝜍 ∈ [𝑙𝑘
Δ
, 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
+ Δ] we define
𝑥 = 𝜍 − 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
and 𝑋 will be used to denote a random variable
which represents 𝑥. The value of Δ should be small enough
so that the distribution of 𝑋 can be considered uniform. A
random variable that represents quantized coefficients inside
𝑘th interval is denoted as 𝑋󸀠 and its realization is denoted as
𝑥
󸀠. Each pair of an original 𝑥 and corresponding quantized
𝑥
󸀠 belongs to the same 𝑘th embedding interval so that an
absolute shift is never larger than Δ. Correspondingly, a
random variable that represents quantized coefficients on the
whole real number line is denoted as Σ󸀠 and its realization is
denoted as 𝜍󸀠.
In order to provide efficient recovery after GA, we
propose the following asymmetric distribution of quantized
samples 𝑥󸀠 inside 𝑘th embedding interval (Figure 1(a)):
𝑓 (𝑥
󸀠
) =
{{{{
{{{{
{
(𝛾0 + 𝜂1) 𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) , if 𝑥󸀠 ∈ [0, Δ (𝛽 − 𝛼)] ,
(𝜑1 + 𝜗0) 𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) , if 𝑥󸀠 ∈ [Δ𝛽, Δ] ,
0, otherwise,
(1)
where 𝑓0(𝑥
󸀠
) and 𝑓1(𝑥
󸀠
) are two different kinds of truncated
distributions defined as
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) =
{
{
{
𝑐𝑥
󸀠
+ 𝜏, if 𝑥󸀠 ∈ [0, Δ (𝛽 − 𝛼)] ,
0, otherwise,
(2)
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) =
{
{
{
𝑔, if 𝑥󸀠 ∈ [Δ𝛽, Δ] ,
0, otherwise.
(3)
The other parameters are constrained in the following way:
0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1, 𝛾0 + 𝜗0 + 𝜑1 + 𝜂1 = 1 (see
Nomenclature section).Themeaning of parameters 𝛾0, 𝜗0,𝜑1,
𝜂1 will be discussed later in Section 3. In Figure 1(b) we can
see the distribution of the quantized coefficients outside 𝑘th
embedding interval as well.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the quantized coefficients: (a) Inside 𝑘th embedding interval. (b) In five consecutive intervals.
2.2. Procedure for GA Recovery. It is assumed that under GA
the original length of embedding interval Δ is altered by
unknown gain factor 𝜆 and the resulting length is Δ̃ = 𝜆Δ.
In addition to that, AWGN attack is applied. The procedure
for GA recovery is the estimator whose result is based
on a criterion having higher values for the right length Δ̃
of embedding interval. The uniqueness of the distribution
of quantized samples is exploited by two different criteria
𝐶1 and 𝐶2. The procedure itself represents a brute force
approach that substitutes guessed values Δ̃󸀠 of the length
of embedding interval into a criterion. Guessed value of Δ̃󸀠
which maximizes it (𝐶1 or 𝐶2) should be selected:
Δ̃
󸀠󸀠
= argmax
{Δ̃
󸀠
}
𝐶1,2 (Δ̃
󸀠
) , (4)
where Δ̃󸀠󸀠 is the final output of the procedure. Some interval
[Δ̃
󸀠
min, Δ̃
󸀠
max] for guessed values Δ̃
󸀠 should be defined in
advance. For instance, Δ̃󸀠min = 0.9Δ and Δ̃
󸀠
max = 1.1Δ works
well in most cases because the diapason of scaling factor 𝜆 is
quite limited on practice.
For each particular value Δ̃󸀠, the index defined according
to the criterion is calculated by projecting noisy quantized
samples 𝜍󸀠
𝑛
on a single embedding interval:
𝑥
󸀠
𝑛
=
{{{{
{{{{
{
𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
mod Δ̃󸀠, if
[
[
[
[
𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
Δ̃
󸀠
]
]
]
]
mod 2 = 0,
Δ̃
󸀠
− (𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
mod Δ̃󸀠) , otherwise.
(5)
This is needed to reconstruct the distribution of quantized
samples inside embedding interval.
Two criteria are proposed for the assessment of the
distribution of random variable 𝑋󸀠
𝑛
∈ [0, Δ̃
󸀠
] (subscript “𝑛”
means affected by noise):
𝐶1 (Δ̃
󸀠
) =
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
median (𝑋󸀠
𝑛
)
Δ̃
󸀠
− 0.5
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
,
𝐶2 (Δ̃
󸀠
) =
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝜇𝑤 (𝑋
󸀠
𝑛
)
(Δ̃
󸀠
)
𝑤
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
, 𝑤 = 2𝑚 + 1, 𝑚 ∈ N.
(6)
Here, 𝜇𝑤 is the 𝑤th central moment. Odd moments
are zero for symmetric distributions, but for asymmetric
distributions their values can be sufficiently large. If the
assumption about Δ̃ is wrong, then the values of both criteria
are low. In that case the distribution of 𝑋󸀠
𝑛
is very close to
uniform (which is symmetric). This is because of the effect
caused by GA on calculation of 𝑥󸀠
𝑛
in (5). Nevertheless, the
distribution of𝑋󸀠
𝑛
demonstrates asymmetry in case Δ̃󸀠 is close
to Δ̃. The explanation is that the distribution of quantized
samples inside embedding interval (before GA is introduced)
is indeed asymmetric. In spite of utilization of brute force
optimization, the procedure is simple and the computational
demand is low. On practice, the number of brute force steps
is much smaller than the number of quantized elements.
Therefore, the complexity is 𝑂(𝑛) in that case. For instance,
for recovery with high accuracy it is enough to perform 103
brute force steps with values from the interval [Δ̃󸀠min, Δ̃
󸀠
max].
3. Quantization
A quantization model is introduced in this section. In
order to represent it in a compact form, we combine all
the quantization conditions in a single logical expression.
Previously proposed distribution of quantized samples is
assured. However, additional parameter of the quantization
model implies different distribution of the samples associated
with labels “0” and “1.”
3.1. TwoApproaches for Quantization. Quantized samples are
modified according to themodel described in this subsection.
A watermark bit is denoted as 𝑏. Each sample with value 𝑥
inside 𝑘th embedding interval has index 𝑖 ∈ N according
to its order in the host sequence. During watermarking a
bit is assigned to each index 𝑖. Different frameworks might
be used for description of the quantization model. We will
use first order predicate logic to describe our approach. This
choice can be reasoned as follows. A closed-from expression
has to be defined for quantization and it is important to
show that the derived solution minimizes MSE between
initial and target distribution. The kind of proposed target
distribution is not common for QIM-based watermarking
methods. Therefore, we find it necessary to explain in detail
the process of derivation of quantization expression. Also,
samples interpreting “0” should be quantized in a different
way to samples interpreting “1.” Predicate logic is a suitable
4 Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
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Figure 2: Scheme of labeling and distribution of original samples prior to quantization.
tool for description of embedding because logical construc-
tion can incorporate all the possible quantization conditions
in a compact form.
Two-place predicate 𝐸 is to denote correspondence
between some index and the value of coefficient. For example,
𝐸𝑖𝑥 is true if a coefficient with order 𝑖 has value 𝑥. We will
further use notation of the set E which contains all the pairs
(𝑥, 𝑖) that provide true value of 𝐸𝑖𝑥. One-place predicate 𝐵 is
to denote bit value assigned to a coefficient with particular
index. For instance, 𝐵𝑖 is true if watermark bit 𝑏 = 1 is
assigned to a coefficient with index 𝑖 and ∼ 𝐵𝑖 is true if 𝑏 = 0.
Two-place predicates 𝑋0 or 𝑋1 will be used to define that
some 𝑖th sample with value 𝑥 has label “0” or “1,” respectively:
(𝑋0𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝐸𝑖𝑥& ∼ 𝐵𝑖)) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) , (7)
(𝑋1𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝐸𝑖𝑥&𝐵𝑖)) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) . (8)
Sets X0 and X1 contain all the pairs (𝑥, 𝑖) that provide
true values of 𝑋0𝑖𝑥 and 𝑋1𝑖𝑥, respectively. Initial PDFs of 𝑋
inside X0, X1, and E are considered to be uniform: 𝑓X
0
(𝑥) =
𝑓X
1
(𝑥) = 𝑓E(𝑥) = 1/Δ (Figure 2).
Also, each coefficient is labeled either as IDL or non-
IDL depending on its value 𝑥 and index 𝑖. Samples labeled
as IDL are quantized in a different way which reduces
the total embedding distortion. Both types of coefficients
(IDL and non-IDL) are being modified during quantization.
However, after quantization, interpretation of a bit of each
IDL coefficient is incorrect. The purpose of quantization is
to provide that all the non-IDL samples can be extracted
correctly and the resulting distribution of all the samples
is the one depicted in Figure 1(a). Parameters 𝜂1 and 𝜗0
represent fractions of IDL for 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑏 = 0, respectively.
Parameters 𝜑1 and 𝛾0 represent fractions of non-IDL samples
for 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑏 = 0, respectively. The fraction of zeros in a
watermark data is 𝛾0 + 𝜗0 and fraction of ones is 𝜑1 + 𝜂1. It is
required that 𝛾0 + 𝜗0 + 𝜑1 + 𝜂1 = 1.
We define IDL and non-IDL samples using two-place
predicates IDL0, IDL1, NIDL0, and NIDL1 in the following
way (Figure 2):
(IDL0𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝑋0𝑖𝑥& (𝑥 > 𝐿1))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) ,
(IDL1𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝑋1𝑖𝑥& (𝑥 < 𝐿2))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) ,
(NIDL0𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝑋0𝑖𝑥& (𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) ,
(NIDL1𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝑋1𝑖𝑥& (𝑥 ≥ 𝐿2))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) ,
(9)
where 𝐿1 = Δ𝛾0/(𝛾0 + 𝜗0), 𝐿2 = Δ𝜂1/(𝜑1 + 𝜂1), and 𝐿1 ≥ 𝐿2.
Sets IDL0, IDL1,NIDL0, andNIDL1 will be used in order
to specify all the coefficients that satisfy IDL0, IDL1, NIDL0,
and NIDL1, respectively. Fractions 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, and 𝜂1 can be
expressed in terms of cardinalities of sets IDL0, IDL1,NIDL0,
NIDL1, and E. For example, |IDL0|/|E| = 𝜗0.
In this paper, two different quantization techniques are
proposed. Since predicate logic is used to describe watermark
embedding, a suitable logical construction should be able to
distinguish between the techniques. According to our model,
each kind of quantization can be represented by setting
a corresponding logical value (“0” or “1”) for zero-place
predicateΩ. Hence,Ω is used to define one out of two possible
quantization techniques. For each kind of quantization, E is
split on two subsets E0 and E1. For two-place predicates 𝐸0
and 𝐸1 formulas 𝐸0𝑖𝑥 and 𝐸1𝑖𝑥 are defined in the following
way:
(𝐸0𝑖𝑥
≡ (NIDL0𝑖𝑥 ∨ (IDL1𝑖𝑥&Ω) ∨ (IDL0𝑖𝑥& ∼ Ω))) ,
(∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) ,
(10)
(𝐸1𝑖𝑥 ≡ (𝐸𝑖𝑥& ∼ 𝐸0𝑖𝑥)) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) . (11)
Using information about distribution inside IDL0, IDL1,
NIDL0, and NIDL1 it is easy to derive distribution inside
E0 and E1. Let us introduce variable 𝜔 ∈ {0, 1} of natural
numbers domain N (not a logical variable) which satisfies
(Ω ⊃ (𝜔 = 1))& (∼ Ω ⊃ (𝜔 = 0)). Common arithmetical
operations can be performed with 𝜔 which makes it possible
to express PDF 𝑓E
0
(𝑥) in the following compact form:
𝑓E
0
(𝑥)
=
{{{{{{{{
{{{{{{{{
{
(𝛾0 + 𝜗0) 𝑓X
0
(𝑥) + 𝜔 (𝜑1 + 𝜂1) 𝑓X
1
(𝑥)
𝐷𝑁0
, if 𝑥 ≤ 𝐿2,
(𝛾0 + 𝜗0) 𝑓X
0
(𝑥)
𝐷𝑁0
, if 𝐿2 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1,
(1 − 𝜔) (𝛾0 + 𝜗0) 𝑓X
0
(𝑥)
𝐷𝑁0
, otherwise,
(12)
where𝐷𝑁0 = (𝜔𝜂1 + 𝛾0 + (1 − 𝜔)𝜗0).
Therefore 𝑓E
1
(𝑥) can be expressed as (Figures 3 and 4)
𝑓E
1
(𝑥) =
𝑓E (𝑥) − 𝐷𝑁0𝑓E
0
(𝑥)
1 − 𝐷𝑁0
. (13)
Elements of sets E0 and E1 are modified during quanti-
zation so that new sets E󸀠
0
and E󸀠
1
are obtained, respectively.
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Therefore, for successful quantization, we require the follow-
ing formula 𝐹1 to be true:
𝐹1 ≡ ((𝐸0𝑖𝑥 ⊃ 𝐸
󸀠
0
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
)& (𝐸1𝑖𝑥 ⊃ 𝐸
󸀠
1
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
(∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) (∃𝑥
󸀠
) .
(14)
As a result of quantization, variables 𝑋E
0
and 𝑋E
1
are
modified in a way that the resulting 𝑋󸀠E󸀠
0
and 𝑋󸀠E󸀠
1
are dis-
tributed according to some desired distributions. For each
kind of quantization (depending on the value of Ω), the pair
of desired distributions is different.We propose the following
distributions that can be expressed as (Figures 3 and 4)
6 Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
𝑓E󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) = 𝜔𝑓
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) + (1 − 𝜔)
𝛾0𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) + 𝜗0𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
)
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
,
𝑓E󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) = 𝜔𝑓
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) + (1 − 𝜔)
𝜂1𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) + 𝜑1𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
)
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
.
(15)
It can be seen that, for any logical value ofΩ, the distribution
of𝑋󸀠 inside {E0∪E1} is the same andmatches the distribution
represented in Figure 1. It means that the efficiency of the
procedure of GA recovery (proposed in the previous section)
cannot be affected by the selection ofΩ.
In addition to the necessity of providing desired dis-
tribution of the quantized samples, we need to minimize
quantization distortions. Both requirements can be expressed
by two two-place predicates 𝑈 and 𝑉:
(𝐸
󸀠
0
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
≡ 𝐸0𝑖𝑥&𝑈𝑥𝑥
󸀠
) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) ,
(𝐸
󸀠
1
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
≡ 𝐸1𝑖𝑥&𝑉𝑥𝑥
󸀠
) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(16)
The idea ofminimization of embedding distortions can be
explained in the following example. Assuming two samples
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗 ∈ E0, 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑗, we infer that quantization in a way
in which 𝑥󸀠
𝑖
≤ 𝑥
󸀠
𝑗
implies less distortion than in case when
𝑥
󸀠
𝑖
> 𝑥
󸀠
𝑗
. Let us sort elements in E0 and E󸀠0 in the dimension of
𝑥 and 𝑥󸀠, respectively.Then, for some 𝑥𝑖 (index 𝑖 is an order in
a host sequence) the number of elements in E0 with 𝑥 value
less than 𝑥𝑖 should be equal to the number of elements in E󸀠0
that have 𝑥󸀠 value less than 𝑥󸀠
𝑖
. Integration should be used
in case we switch from discrete distribution of samples in E0
and E󸀠
0
to continuous one. Further, throughout the paper we
assume that the constant of integration is zero for indefinite
integrals. Hence, the truth values for both predicates𝑈 and𝑉
are defined as
(𝑈𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (∫𝑓E
0
(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 = ∫𝑓E󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) ,
(17)
(𝑉𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (∫𝑓E
1
(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 = ∫𝑓E󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(18)
Further, we introduce logical formula 𝐹2
𝐹2 ≡ ((∃𝑥
󸀠
)𝑈𝑥𝑥
󸀠& (∃𝑥󸀠)𝑉𝑥𝑥󸀠) , (∀𝑥) (19)
and state that argument
𝐹2, (11) , (16) ⊨ 𝐹1 (20)
is valid.The task of watermark embedding is to assure that the
mentioned argument is sound. For that purpose, a procedure
that makes 𝐹2 true should be proposed.
3.2. Quantization Equations. Quantization equations and
their solutions are needed to satisfy formula 𝐹2 during
embedding. For this purpose, we will analyze conditions that
enforce qualities of predicates 𝑈 and 𝑉. Due to the large
number of variables in the text we recommend to refer to
Nomenclature section for clarity. We can rewrite elements of
(17) in the following way:
∫𝑓E
0
(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 =
{{{
{{{
{
min (𝑥, 𝐿2) 𝜔 (𝜑1 + 𝜂1) + 𝑥 (𝛾0 + 𝜗0)
Δ𝐷𝑁0
, if 𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1;
𝜔 +
(1 − 𝜔) 𝑥 (𝛾0 + 𝜗0)
Δ𝐷𝑁0
, otherwise,
∫ 𝑓E󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
=
{{{
{{{
{
(𝜔 + 𝛾0
1 − 𝜔
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
)∫𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
, if 𝑥󸀠 ≤ Δ𝛽;
(𝜔 + 𝛾0
1 − 𝜔
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
) + 𝜗0
1 − 𝜔
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
(∫𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
+ ∫
0
Δ𝛽
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
) , otherwise.
(21)
From (21) it is clear that
∫
𝐿
1
0
𝑓E
0
(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 = ∫
Δ(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓E󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
= 𝜔 + 𝛾0
1 − 𝜔
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
.
(22)
The equation above means that the following is true:
(𝑈𝑥𝑥
󸀠
⊃ (((𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1)& (𝑥
󸀠
≤ Δ𝛽))
∨ ((𝑥 > 𝐿1)& (𝑥
󸀠
> Δ𝛽)))) , (∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(23)
We introduce two two-place predicates 𝑈1 and 𝑈2:
(((𝑈𝑥𝑥
󸀠& (𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1)& (𝑥
󸀠
≤ Δ𝛽)) ≡ 𝑈
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)
& ((𝑈𝑥𝑥󸀠& (𝑥 > 𝐿1)& (𝑥
󸀠
> Δ𝛽)) ≡ 𝑈
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(24)
According to (21) and (24) the following can be derived:
(𝑈
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (Υ1 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) = 0.5𝑐𝑥
󸀠2
+ 𝜏𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
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(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) ,
(𝑈
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (Υ2 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) = 𝑔 (𝑥
󸀠
− Δ𝛽))) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) ,
(25)
where
Υ1 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1)
= (𝛾0 + 𝜗0)
min (𝑥, 𝐿2) 𝜔 (𝜑1 + 𝜂1) + 𝑥 (𝛾0 + 𝜗0)
Δ𝐷𝑁0 (𝛾0 + 𝜔𝜗0)
,
Υ2 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) =
𝑥 (𝛾0 + 𝜗0)
2
− 𝛾0Δ𝐷𝑁0
𝜗0Δ𝐷𝑁0
.
(26)
Now, let us analyze conditions that enforce quality of predi-
cate 𝑉. Elements of (18) can be represented as
∫𝑓E
1
(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 =
{{{{
{{{{
{
(1 − 𝜔) 𝑥 (𝜑1 + 𝜂1)
Δ (1 − 𝐷𝑁0)
, if 𝑥 ≤ 𝐿2;
max (𝑥 − 𝐿1, 0) 𝜔 (𝛾0 + 𝜗0) + (𝑥 − 𝐿2) (𝜑1 + 𝜂1)
Δ (1 − 𝐷𝑁0)
, otherwise,
∫ 𝑓E󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
=
{{{
{{{
{
(1 − 𝜔) 𝜂1
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
∫𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
, if 𝑥󸀠 ≤ Δ𝛽;
(1 − 𝜔) 𝜂1
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
+ (𝜔 + 𝜑1
1 − 𝜔
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
)(∫𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
+ ∫
0
Δ𝛽
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
) , otherwise.
(27)
We can see that according to (25)
∫
𝐿
2
0
𝑓E
1
(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥 = ∫
Δ(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓E󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
=
(1 − 𝜔) 𝜂1
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
. (28)
This means that the following expression is true:
(𝑉𝑥𝑥
󸀠
⊃ (((𝑥 ≤ 𝐿2)& (𝑥
󸀠
≤ Δ𝛽))
∨ ((𝑥 > 𝐿2)& (𝑥
󸀠
> Δ𝛽)))) , (∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(29)
Next, two two-place predicates 𝑉1 and 𝑉2 are defined as
(((𝑉𝑥𝑥
󸀠& (𝑥 ≤ 𝐿2)& (𝑥
󸀠
≤ Δ𝛽)) ≡ 𝑉
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)
& ((𝑉𝑥𝑥󸀠& (𝑥 > 𝐿2)& (𝑥
󸀠
> Δ𝛽)) ≡ 𝑉
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(30)
According to (27) and (30) the following can be derived:
(𝑉
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (Υ3 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) = 0.5𝑐𝑥
󸀠2
+ 𝜏𝑥
󸀠
)) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) ,
(𝑉
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (Υ4 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) = 𝑔 (𝑥
󸀠
− Δ𝛽))) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) ,
(31)
where
Υ3 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) =
𝑥 (𝜑1 + 𝜂1)
2
𝜂1Δ (1 − 𝐷𝑁0)
,
Υ4 (𝑥, 𝜔, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1) =
(𝜑1 + 𝜂1) (max (𝑥 − 𝐿1, 0) 𝜔 (𝛾0 + 𝜗0) + (𝑥 − 𝐿2) (𝜑1 + 𝜂1)) − Δ (1 − 𝐷𝑁0) (1 − 𝜔) 𝜂1
Δ (1 − 𝐷𝑁0) (𝜑1 + 𝜔𝜂1)
.
(32)
We can express 𝑈 using 𝑈1 and 𝑈2 in the following way:
(𝑈𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (((𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1) ⊃ 𝑈
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)& ((𝑥 > 𝐿1) ⊃ 𝑈
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
))) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(33)
Also, we can express 𝑉 using 𝑉1 and 𝑉2:
(𝑉𝑥𝑥
󸀠
≡ (((𝑥 ≤ 𝐿2) ⊃ 𝑉
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)& ((𝑥 > 𝐿2) ⊃ 𝑉
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
))) ,
(∀𝑥) (∀𝑥
󸀠
) .
(34)
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X, b, Δ, 𝜃, 𝜔, Υ1, Υ2, Υ3, Υ4
No
NoNo
No
Yes
Yes
YesYesxi ≥ L2 xi ≤ L1
x󳰀i ←
Υ4 + gΔ𝛽
g
x󳰀i ←
Υ2 + gΔ𝛽
g
i > |X| X 󳰀 End
xi ∈ E0
i ←1
x󳰀i ←
√𝜏2 + 2Υ3c − 𝜏
c
x󳰀i ←
√𝜏2 + 2Υ1c − 𝜏
c
x󳰀i → X
󳰀 ,
i ← i + 1
Figure 5: Quantization diagram for the 𝑘th embedding interval.
Further, utilizing property 𝐿2 ≤ 𝐿1 we can obtain
((𝑥 ≤ 𝐿2) ⊃ ((∃𝑥
󸀠
) (𝑈
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)& (∃𝑥󸀠) (𝑉1𝑥𝑥󸀠))) ,
(∀𝑥) ,
((𝐿2 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝐿1)
⊃ ((∃𝑥
󸀠
) (𝑈
1
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)& (∃𝑥󸀠) (𝑉2𝑥𝑥󸀠))) , (∀𝑥) ,
((𝐿1 < 𝑥) ⊃ ((∃𝑥
󸀠
) (𝑈
2
𝑥𝑥
󸀠
)& (∃𝑥󸀠) (𝑉2𝑥𝑥󸀠)))
⊨ 𝐹2, (∀𝑥) .
(35)
Here, each premise should be true. With the aim to provide
this, equations in (25) and (31) should be solvable. It can be
seen that the solutions are straightforward:
𝑥
󸀠
𝑈1 ,𝑉1
=
√𝜏2 + 2Υ1,3𝑐 − 𝜏
𝑐
,
(36)
𝑥
󸀠
𝑈2 ,𝑉2
=
Υ2,4 + 𝑔Δ𝛽
𝑔
, (37)
where, for example, in (36), 𝑥󸀠
𝑈1 ,𝑉1
denotes the values of
𝑥
󸀠 that turn either 𝑈1𝑥𝑥󸀠 or 𝑉1𝑥𝑥󸀠 true for Υ1(⋅) or Υ3(⋅),
respectively. The diagram of quantization is represented in
Figure 5. Each 𝑖th original sample is chosen from array X
on 𝑖th iteration. The corresponding bit of a watermark is
chosen from array b. Vector 𝜃 contains parameters of the
quantization. At the end of each iteration, quantized value of
𝑖th sample is written to array X󸀠.
4. Robustness under AWGN
In this section, we will analytically estimate the robust-
ness of the proposed watermarking scheme under AWGN.
Robustness is reflected by the term “extracted information”
which denotes mutual information between embedded and
detected messages. In contrast to channel capacity, the index
of extracted information is practical but depends on the
algorithm of detection. Also, throughout this section we
assume that the original samples are distributed uniformly
inside the quantization interval.
The derivations for extracted information are less
involved when Ω is “false.” Therefore, only that condition is
considered here. In order to estimate extracted information
we first find error rates. The rates depend on the attack
severity (represented by 𝜎), Δ, and parameter set 𝜃 = {𝛾0,
𝜑1, 𝜂1, 𝜗0, 𝛼, 𝛽}. Moreover, we derive a stronger statement
that information about Δ/𝜎 and 𝜃 is sufficient to perform
analytic estimation of error rates for our watermarking
scheme. Finally, we will demonstrate how error rates can be
expressed using WNR and 𝜃.
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4.1. Estimation of Error Rates. For our estimation, it is consid-
ered that, during watermark extraction, in each embedding
interval samples that interpret “0” are separated from samples
that interpret “1” using a threshold (e.g., hard decision region
detector). The position of the threshold in 𝑖th embedding
interval is Th+[Δ−2Th] mod (𝑖−𝑘, 2) (dashed vertical lines
in Figure 1(b)). Therefore, the whole real number line can be
seen as a union of two domains:
Z =
∞
⋃
𝑚=−∞
[2Δ𝑚 + 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
−Th, 2Δ𝑚 + 𝑙𝑘
Δ
+Th) , (38)
O =
∞
⋃
𝑚=−∞
[2Δ𝑚 + 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
+Th, 2Δ (𝑚 + 1) + 𝑙𝑘
Δ
−Th) . (39)
During extraction, all the elements in Z will be labeled “0”
and all the elements inO will be labeled “1.”
After noise is added, elements quantized in 𝑘th embed-
ding interval might spread over its limits and other notations
should be used. We notate sample values that are affected
by noise as 𝜍󸀠
𝑛
. Also, 𝜍󸀠
𝑛
belongs to some embedding interval
and inside this interval we use 𝑥󸀠
𝑛
= 𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− Δ⌊𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
/Δ⌋. Random
variablesΣ󸀠
𝑛
and𝑋󸀠
𝑛
represent 𝜍󸀠
𝑛
and 𝑥󸀠
𝑛
, respectively (alterna-
tively we use Σ̇󸀠 and ?̇?󸀠 to save space in lower subscript part).
Therefore, two modified sets are obtained: E󸀠
0
AWGN
󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ Σ̇
󸀠
0
;
E󸀠
1
AWGN
󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ Σ̇
󸀠
1
. For noise variance 𝜎2 we might, for instance,
estimate the expected fraction for each of the noisy sets Σ̇󸀠
0
and Σ̇󸀠
1
in Z. Fractions of Σ̇󸀠
0
and Σ̇󸀠
1
that belong to O can be
found in a trivial manner. In that way we obtain error rates
for “0” and “1.”
However, instead of appealing directly to sets Σ̇󸀠
0
and
Σ̇
󸀠
1
, we use an indirect but computationally lighter approach.
In case Ω is “false” we can conclude for the following
distributions of quantized samples (not affected by AWGN
yet) that
𝑓Ě󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) = 𝑓Ě󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) = 𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) , (40)
where
(?̌?
󸀠
0
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
≡ (𝐸
󸀠
0
𝑖𝑥
󸀠& (𝑥󸀠 ≤ Δ (𝛽 − 𝛼)))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥󸀠) ,
(?̌?
󸀠
1
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
≡ (𝐸
󸀠
1
𝑖𝑥
󸀠& (𝑥󸀠 ≤ Δ (𝛽 − 𝛼)))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥󸀠) .
(41)
Also, we can conclude that the following distributions are also
identical:
𝑓Ê󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
) = 𝑓Ê󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
) = 𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) , (42)
where
(?̂?
󸀠
0
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
≡ (𝐸
󸀠
0
𝑖𝑥
󸀠& (𝑥󸀠 ≥ Δ𝛽))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥󸀠) ,
(?̂?
󸀠
1
𝑖𝑥
󸀠
≡ (𝐸
󸀠
1
𝑖𝑥
󸀠& (𝑥󸀠 ≥ Δ𝛽))) , (∀𝑖) (∀𝑥󸀠) .
(43)
For any 𝜎, (40) means that, for example, the fraction of
elements from Ě
󸀠
0
that after AWGN appear in Z is equal to
that of Ě
󸀠
1
and can be calculated using 𝑓0(𝑥
󸀠
). This fraction
will be denoted as ?̌?Z. The PDF of AWGNwith variance 𝜎
2
𝑛
is
denoted as 𝑓N[𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
−𝜍
󸀠
, 0, 𝜎𝑛] using parameters 𝜍
󸀠
= 𝑥
󸀠
+𝑙
𝑘
Δ
and
𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
. Therefore
?̌?Z
= ∫
Z
∫
Δ(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑓N [𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑥
󸀠
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
, 0, 𝜎𝑛] 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
𝑑𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
.
(44)
Fraction of elements from Ê󸀠
0
that after AWGN appear in Z
will be denoted as ?̂?Z:
?̂?Z = ∫
Z
∫
Δ
Δ𝛽
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑓N [𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑥
󸀠
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
, 0, 𝜎𝑛] 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
𝑑𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
. (45)
Error rates are calculated using ?̌?Z and ?̂?Z:
BER0 = (1 − ?̌?Z)
𝛾0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
+ (1 − ?̂?Z)
𝜗0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
,
BER1 = ?̌?Z
𝜂1
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
+ ?̂?Z
𝜑1
𝜑1 + 𝜂1
.
(46)
In order to demonstrate that error rates can be calculated
based on Δ/𝜎, 𝜃 we analyze expression for ?̌?Z (expression
for ?̂?Z can be analyzed in a similar way). Function 𝑓0(𝑥
󸀠
)
is present in (44). According to (2) it is defined using
parameters 𝑐, 𝜏. Parameters 𝛼, 𝛽 are also present in (2) as well
as in (44). Parameters 𝛼, 𝛽 have clear constraints (the same is
true about 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1). It is possible to express 𝑐, 𝜏 using 𝛼,
𝛽, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1. In the realization of our method parameter 𝜏
is set as
𝜏 =
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
Δ𝛾0
. (47)
Defining new parameter ?́? as
?́? = 𝜏Δ, (48)
it can be seen that ?́? = (𝛾0 + 𝜗0)/𝛾0 does not depend on the
choice of Δ.
Using property of PDF, the following is obtained from (2):
∫
(𝛽−𝛼)Δ
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
= 𝑐
(𝛽 − 𝛼)
2
Δ
2
2
+ 𝜏Δ (𝛽 − 𝛼)
= 1.
(49)
It is easy to derive from (48) and (49) that
𝑐Δ
2
= 2
1 − ?́? (𝛽 − 𝛼)
(𝛽 − 𝛼)
2
. (50)
According to (50), it is also obvious that parameter
́𝑐 = 𝑐Δ
2 (51)
is independent of Δ.
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One of the properties of PDF of AWGN is
𝑓N [𝑥, 0, 𝜎𝑛] =
1
𝜎𝑛
𝑓N [
𝑥
𝜎𝑛
, 0, 1] . (52)
Therefore, we can rewrite (44) in the following manner:
?̌?Z = ∫
Z
∫
Δ(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑓N [𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑥
󸀠
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
, 0,
𝜎𝑛] 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
𝑑𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
=
Δ
2
𝜎𝑛
∫
(Z−𝑙𝑘
Δ
)/Δ
∫
(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
)
⋅ 𝑓N [Δ
(𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
) − 𝑥
󸀠
Δ𝜎𝑛
,
0, 1] 𝑑{
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
}𝑑{
(𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
)
Δ
} .
(53)
Now, it can be demonstrated that domain
Ź =
(Z − 𝑙𝑘
Δ
)
Δ
=
∞
⋃
𝑚=−∞
[2𝑚 −
Th
Δ
, 2𝑚 +
Th
Δ
) (54)
is independent of Δ if during extraction parameter
́Th = Th
Δ
(55)
can be set without information about Δ (e.g., ́Th may be set
as ́Th = 𝛽 − 0.5𝛼). Hence, (53) can be represented in the
following way:
?̌?Z = ∫
Ź
∫
(𝛽−𝛼)
0
Δ
𝜎𝑛
( ́𝑐
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
+ ?́?)𝑓N [
Δ
𝜎𝑛
(𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
) − 𝑥
󸀠
Δ
,
0, 1] 𝑑{
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
}𝑑{
(𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
)
Δ
} .
(56)
Here, for integration we consider (𝜍󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
)/Δ ∈ Ź and 𝑥󸀠/Δ ∈
[0, (𝛽 − 𝛼)], where both domains Ź and [0, (𝛽 − 𝛼)] depend
only on 𝛽, 𝛼. Except the terms (𝜍󸀠
𝑛
− 𝑙
𝑘
Δ
)/Δ and 𝑥󸀠/Δ, only
Δ/𝜎𝑛, ́𝑐, ?́? appear under the integrals. Therefore, the result of
integration, ?̌?Z, depends only on Δ/𝜎𝑛, 𝜃.
Further we will express Δ/𝜎𝑛 in terms of WNR and 𝜃
which confirms that BER0 and BER1 can be defined using
only WNR and 𝜃.
4.2. Estimation of Δ/𝜎𝑛. Measure WNR is widely used in
watermarking. It expresses relation between watermark and
noise energies and in AWGN case is
WNR = 10 log
10
(
𝐷
𝜎2
) , (57)
where 𝐷 is the energy of the watermark. Plot of robustness
index in respect to WNR is one of the characteristics that
are the most meaningful for practical implementation [4, 11].
Therefore it is important to be able to express error rates
using WNR and the set of embedding parameters 𝜃. For this
purpose, we first express Δ/𝜎𝑛 using WNR and 𝜃.
Parameter 𝐷 in (57) can be seen as a distortion of a host
signal, caused by the quantization. There are many different
approaches that adequately assess quality degradation for
digital images [19, 20]. Nevertheless, in this paper we are
using simple and well-known distortion measure based on
MSE between original and quantized samples [21]. We will
define 𝐷 and factor it in a form Δ2𝑄, where 𝑄 depends
only on 𝜃. It is assumed that original samples are distributed
uniformly inside embedding interval. Distortion𝐷 is needed
to obtain quantized sets Ě
󸀠
0
, Ě
󸀠
1
, Ê󸀠
0
, and Ê󸀠
1
. Therefore, further
we will consider 𝐷 as a sum of four kinds of distortion: 𝐷 =
?̌?0 + ?̌?1 + ?̂?0 + ?̂?1. Each of the distortion components is
defined as follows:
?̌?0 = 𝛾0 ∫
Δ(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
)(𝑥
󸀠
−
Δ𝛾
0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
⋅ ∫
𝑥
󸀠
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
)
2
𝑑𝑥
󸀠
,
?̌?1 = 𝜂1 ∫
Δ(𝛽−𝛼)
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
)(𝑥
󸀠
−
Δ𝜂1
𝜂1 + 𝜑1
⋅ ∫
𝑥
󸀠
0
𝑓0 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
)
2
𝑑𝑥
󸀠
,
?̂?0 = 𝜗0 ∫
Δ
𝛽Δ
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
)(𝑥
󸀠
− (
Δ𝜗0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
∫
𝑥
󸀠
𝛽Δ
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
+
Δ𝛾
0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
))
2
𝑑𝑥
󸀠
,
?̂?1 = 𝜑1 ∫
Δ
𝛽Δ
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
)(𝑥
󸀠
− (
Δ𝜑1
𝜂1 + 𝜑1
∫
𝑥
󸀠
𝛽Δ
𝑓1 (𝑥
󸀠
) 𝑑𝑥
󸀠
+
Δ𝜂1
𝜂1 + 𝜑1
))
2
𝑑𝑥
󸀠
.
(58)
It can be demonstrated that each of the distortion com-
ponents can be factored using Δ2. For instance, considering
?̌?0 the next result can be obtained:
?̌?0 = Δ
2
𝛾
0
∫
(𝛽−𝛼)
0
( ́𝑐
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
+ ?́?)(
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
− ?̌?
0
∫
𝑥
󸀠
/Δ
0
( ́𝑐
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
+ ?́?) 𝑑{
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
})
2
𝑑{
𝑥
󸀠
Δ
}
= Δ
2
?̌?0,
(59)
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where
?̌?0 = 𝛾0 (𝛽 − 𝛼)
3
(
́𝑐
3
?̌?
2
0
24
(𝛽 − 𝛼)
3
+ ́𝑐
2
?̌?
0
5?́??̌?
0
− 4
20
(𝛽 − 𝛼)
2
+
́𝑐 (1 − ?́??̌?
0
) (1 − 2?́??̌?
0
)
4
(𝛽 − 𝛼) +
?́? (1 − ?́??̌?
0
)
2
3
) .
(60)
Here
?̌?
0
=
𝛾0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
. (61)
The rest of the distortion components can also be factored in
a similar way, where
?̌?1 = 𝜂1 (𝛽 − 𝛼)
3
(
́𝑐
3
?̌?
2
1
24
(𝛽 − 𝛼)
3
+ ́𝑐
2
?̌?
1
5?́??̌?
1
− 4
20
(𝛽 − 𝛼)
2
+
́𝑐 (1 − ?́??̌?
1
) (1 − 2?́??̌?
1
)
4
(𝛽 − 𝛼) +
?́? (1 − ?́??̌?
1
)
2
3
) ,
?̂?0 = 𝜗0?́? (1 − 𝛽)(
(1 − ?̂?
0
?́?)
2
3
(1 + 𝛽 + 𝛽
2
)
+ (1 − ?̂?
0
?́?) (?̂?
0
?́?𝛽 − ?̌?
0
) (1 + 𝛽) + (?̂?
0
?́?𝛽 − ?̌?
0
)
2
) ,
?̂?1 = 𝜑1?́? (1 − 𝛽)(
(1 − ?̂?
1
?́?)
2
3
(1 + 𝛽 + 𝛽
2
)
+ (1 − ?̂?
1
?́?) (?̂?
1
?́?𝛽 − ?̌?
1
) (1 + 𝛽) + (?̂?
1
?́?𝛽 − ?̌?
1
)
2
) ,
?̌?
1
=
𝜂1
𝜂1 + 𝜑1
,
?̂?
0
= 1 − ?̌?
0
=
𝜗0
𝛾0 + 𝜗0
,
?̂?
1
= 1 − ?̌?
1
=
𝜑1
𝜂1 + 𝜑1
.
(62)
Factorization in the form𝐷 = Δ2𝑄 can be done based on
𝑄 = ?̌?0 + ?̌?1 + ?̂?0 + ?̂?1. Therefore, according to (57) Δ/𝜎 can
be expressed in the following way:
Δ
𝜎
= √
10
0.1∗WNR
?̌?0 + ?̌?1 + ?̂?0 + ?̂?1
. (63)
5. Experimental Results
In this section, two different settings are considered for
experiments. AWGN attack is investigated assuming the first
kind of settings and GA attack is investigated assuming the
second kind of settings. For the first type, the obtained
results are compared with the results of QIM and DC-QIM.
For the second type, the performance is compared with the
results of RDM (DC-QIM was not considered here as it is
vulnerable to GA). Here, in each type of experiment, the
goal is to estimate the highest possible amount of extracted
information of the method for a given intensity of attack.
We explore optimization of embedding parameters. During
watermark embedding, parameters 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1, andΩdefine
sets E0 and E1. In addition to the mentioned parameters,
𝑐, 𝜏, and 𝑔 are needed to define E󸀠
0
and E󸀠
1
. Extracted
information is maximized over 𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1,Ω, 𝑐, 𝜏, and 𝑔 by
brute force approach. With the aim to reduce computations,
parameters 𝜂1, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, and 𝛾0 are constrained according to our
considerations.
5.1. Information Extracted under AWGN. During the experi-
ment, parameters 𝜂1, 𝛾0, 𝜗0, and 𝜑1 were constrained as 𝜂1 +
𝛾0 = 0.5, 𝜗0 +𝜑1 = 0.5. It can be explained by our intention to
use a detector based on median thresholding inside embed-
ding interval.Therefore, if one detects thewatermarkmessage
right after embedding, the IDL fraction for “0” and “1” will
be 𝜗0 and 𝜂1, respectively. One of the advantages of median
thresholding is that no additional information is needed
for detection even though the distribution of quantized
samples is asymmetric and controlled by many parameters.
The parameter Th for median-based (hard decision) detector
is calculated using two steps: (a) for all 𝜍󸀠
𝑛
find 𝑥󸀠
𝑛
according
to (5); (b) calculate Th = median(𝑋󸀠
𝑛
).
For other methods that were used for comparisons, the
standard hard decision detector was used (with equal length
of decision intervals for “0” and “1”).
For the proposed watermarking method IDL occurs only
if the condition 𝛾0 + 𝜑1 < 1 holds. In that case, differ-
ent values of 𝜔 cause different robustness characteristics.
However, IDL might not be suitable for some application
in Digital Watermarking. For instance, in semifragile water-
marking a fraction of lost data can be interpreted as the
presence of an attack (which increases false positive rate).
Therefore, condition 𝛾0 + 𝜑1 = 1 has been investigated
first.
In Figure 6, amount of extracted information toward
WNR is plotted for the proposed method, DC-QIM and
QIM [8]. During watermark extraction, the value of the
normalized threshold was set to ́Th = 𝛽 − 0.5𝛼.
Error rates were calculated according to (46). However,
only the integers from [−100, 100] were used as a set for𝑚 in
(38) instead of the whole setZ. The purpose of the limitation
is to reduce computational complexity while still maintaining
high fidelity of the result. Then, the maximized amount of
extracted information 𝐶 was calculated according to
𝐶 = max
𝑝em(∼𝑏)
[𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, 𝑏) log
2
(
𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, 𝑏)
𝑝em (∼ 𝑏) 𝑝ex (𝑏)
)
+ 𝑝 (𝑏, ∼ 𝑏) log
2
(
𝑝 (𝑏, ∼ 𝑏)
𝑝em (𝑏) 𝑝ex (∼ 𝑏)
)
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Figure 6: Analytic-based estimation of information extracted under
AWGN without IDL.
+ 𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, ∼ 𝑏) log
2
(
𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, ∼ 𝑏)
𝑝em (∼ 𝑏) 𝑝ex (∼ 𝑏)
)
+ 𝑝 (𝑏, 𝑏) log
2
(
𝑝 (𝑏, 𝑏)
𝑝em (𝑏) 𝑝ex (𝑏)
)] .
(64)
Here,𝑝(∼𝑏, 𝑏)denotes joint probability of embedding symbol
∼𝑏 and extracting symbol 𝑏; 𝑝em(𝑏) and 𝑝ex(𝑏) denote prob-
abilities of symbol 𝑏 to be embedded and extracted, respec-
tively. Using joint probabilities, we calculate probabilities of
extracting a particular bit:
𝑝ex (𝑏) = 𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, 𝑏) + 𝑝 (𝑏, 𝑏) ,
𝑝ex (∼ 𝑏) = 𝑝 (𝑏, ∼ 𝑏) + 𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, ∼ 𝑏) .
(65)
Joint probabilities can be expressed using 𝑝em(⋅) and error
rates:
𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, 𝑏) = 𝑝em (∼ 𝑏)BER0,
𝑝 (𝑏, ∼ 𝑏) = 𝑝em (𝑏)BER1,
𝑝 (∼ 𝑏, ∼ 𝑏) = 𝑝em (∼ 𝑏) (1 − BER0) ,
𝑝 (𝑏, 𝑏) = 𝑝em (𝑏) (1 − BER1) .
(66)
As it was mentioned earlier, embedding probabilities are
𝑝em (∼ 𝑏) = 𝛾0 + 𝜗0,
𝑝em (𝑏) = 𝜂1 + 𝜑1.
(67)
From Figure 6 it can be seen that with no IDL the proposed
method performs better than QIM for WNR ≤ 9 dB and
better than DC-QIM for WNR values less than −2 dB.
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Figure 7: Analytic-based estimation of information extracted under
AWGN with IDL.
While comparing the designed method with DC-QIM,
explanation of a slightly better performance should be found
in the new distribution of quantized samples and threshold-
ing technique. Optimal solution for the problem of informed
data hiding has been theorized by Costa [6], and every
known practical answer, including DC-QIM, uses structured
codebook which lacks certain desirable characteristics [11].
We believe that theminor advantage of the presentedmethod
is due to larger number of variables that were adjusted for
embedding.
In case IDL is acceptable (for a particular watermarking
application), much better results are achievable for both
“true” and “false” Ω under low WNRs (Figure 7). Obviously,
the demonstrated superiority is due to IDL only. Additionally,
it can be seen that “false” logical value of Ω provides slightly
more beneficial outcome under AWGN compared to whenΩ
is “true.” As a reference, CostaTheoretical Limit (CTL) [6] is
plotted in Figure 7:
CTL = 1
2
log
2
(1 + 10
0.1∗WNR
) . (68)
5.2. Information Extracted under GA. In this subsection, we
explore performance of the proposed quantization approach
under GA. For comparison, RDM is chosen instead of DC-
QIM as it is known to be vulnerable to GA. We describe
conditions and the results of the simulations based on real
images and assuming watermark embedding followed by
GA.
For the experimental evaluation, we used 92 natural
grayscale images with resolution 512 × 512. Each image was
split on 4× 4 blocks and first singular values of Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD)were quantized to embed awatermark
[22]. The watermarking was arranged without IDL and
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: Common MRI imaging of a patient’s kidney: (a) original diagnostic image; (b) watermarked image.
𝛾0 = 𝜑1 = 0.5. Document to Watermark Ratio (DWR) was
set to 28 dB, where
DWR = 10 log
10
(
𝜎
2
𝐻
𝐷
) (69)
and 𝜎2
𝐻
is the variance of the original coefficients. An example
of original and watermarked diagnostic images is given in
Figure 8.
For some healthcare organizations, protection of personal
data is a high priority task. On the other hand, diagnostic
data might need to be shared between experts from other
organizations. For that purpose, DIW is a suitable tool [23].
However, an important additional constraint is imposed in
that case: an expert conclusion (diagnosis) should not be
affected by watermarking. According to the judgements of
collaborating group of medical imaging experts, the diag-
nostic statement for the watermarked image in Figure 8(b) is
identical to the statement for the original one in Figure 8(a).
For watermark embedding (encoding), a brute force
optimization over 𝛼 and 𝛽 was repeated for each new
value of 𝜎. Obviously, this needs to be done only once as
the optimal parameters can be stored. In addition to the
concept of optimal parameters, we investigated efficiency of a
constrained version of the proposed quantization approach,
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 were constant and equal to 0.05 and 0.35,
respectively. The common sense behind such a modification
is that actual 𝜎 of AWGN might not be known on practice
during watermark embedding (because the attack happens
after embedding).
Forwatermark extraction (hard decision decoding), these
two steps are required: (1) apply GA recovery procedure; (2)
define threshold. In accordance with the proposed procedure
for GA recovery, criterion 𝐶1 was used for the estimation
of actual Δ during the experiment. The condition of GA
was simulated by ignoring information about Δ value that
was used for embedding. Hence, the value was estimated
by the procedure of GA recovery. No information except
initial guess interval with Δ̃󸀠min = 0.9Δ, Δ̃
󸀠
max = 1.1Δ was
used for watermark extraction. In contrast to that, RDMdoes
use the information about the exact value of quantization
step. For RDM, the value of a given quantized coefficient
was calculated using the information about the previous 100
coefficients.
Two types of thresholding are possible and two types
of extraction conditions exist. Under condition when 𝛼
and 𝛽 are constants, no additional information needs to be
transferred to the decoder. However, if 𝛼 and 𝛽 are optimized
on encoder’s side, information about them might need to
be sent. This is necessary if thresholding is established in
the way that ́Th = 𝛽 − 0.5𝛼 (e.g., the threshold is in the
middle of separating zone in quantization interval). Since the
requirement for additional information seems impractical,
we proposed median thresholding Th = median(𝑋󸀠
𝑛
) as well.
For each method that took part in the experiment, the
resulting amount of extracted information is plotted toward
AWGN variance (Figure 9).
As it can be seen from Figure 9, under both mentioned
conditions of embedding, the proposed approach outper-
forms RDM.The advantage is more evident for larger AWGN
variance.
6. Discussion
In the experimental section, robustness of the proposed
quantization method was estimated under AWGN and GA.
The proposed approach provides higher amount of extracted
information compared to the other state-of-the-art reference
methods, like DC-QIM and RDM. The reasons of its superi-
ority will be discussed in more detail in this section.
Asymmetric distribution of quantized samples and the
proposed procedure for GA recovery is a successful com-
bination that provides robustness under GA. Compared to
other estimations of the scaling factor from the literature,
the proposed estimation approach is light. For instance,
in order to estimate the scaling factor, a model of a host
is used in [14] which complicates estimation and reduces
14 Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering
RDM
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Ex
tr
ac
te
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(b
it/
sa
m
pl
e)
𝛾0 + 𝜙1 = 1
𝛾0 + 𝜙1 = 1, constant 𝛼, 𝛽
40 80 120 160 2000
𝜎2
Figure 9: Information extracted under GA followed by AWGN.
its precision. On the other hand, an approach different to
estimation is exploited by RDM [15]. However, Distortion
Compensation is not present in RDM. In contrast to that, the
proposed quantizationmethod hasDistortionCompensation
and outperforms RDM because AWGN is introduced (as a
second stage of GA).
The proposed quantization approach demonstrates
higher robustness under AWGN compared to well-known
DC-QIM. The advancement that causes such superiority is
IDL. Parameter Ω was introduced in order to distinguish
between two different ways of realization for IDL. Target
distribution for all the samples in quantization interval
remains the same for any logical value ofΩ (which guarantees
equally successful recovery from GA). Distributions are
different if “ones” and “zeros” are considered separately.
This influences the resulting performance. As it has been
demonstrated by the experiment, modification of the
quantization approach with “false” Ω performs slightly
better. In general, usage of IDL is beneficial under low
WNRs. The common sense here is that predicting the loss of
some information (as a result of an attack) we might accept
the scenario when a part of information is lost initially.
Compared to DC-QIM, such quantization behavior enables
redistribution of embedding distortion from samples that are
likely to be misinterpreted to the other (non-IDL) samples
that can be more robust.
Unlike DC-QIM, the proposed quantization method has
many parameters that need to be set up for watermark
embedding. Some additional parameters might be needed
depending on the technique for watermark extraction. For
instance, the thresholding that depends on ́Th = 𝛽 −
0.5𝛼 may be applied, which requires parameters 𝛼, 𝛽 to be
communicated to the receiver.
On the other hand, no parameters are needed for extrac-
tion if the proposed median thresholding is used (absolutely
blind extraction). Parameter Δ can be estimated using pro-
cedure for GA recovery taking as input only rough interval
[Δ̃
󸀠
min, Δ̃
󸀠
max]. This is an advantage compared to DC-QIM that
always requires Δ to be known to the decoder.
We do not consider any case with malicious attacks (that
analyze and deliberately change the watermarked signal) as
they are not the objectives of our paper. However in case a
key is used to protect a watermark, it will also be needed for
decoding.
Lastly, we need to emphasize that the computational cost
of our scheme is low. Optimization of embedding parameters
conducted in Section 5 is computationally heavy, but it needs
to be done only once. The optimized parameters can be used
for embedding then. The computational cost of embedding
is comparable with that of DC-QIM (please, refer to the
quantization diagram). For extraction, complexity of the
proposed procedure of GA recovery is 𝑂(𝑛).
7. Conclusions
A new scalar QIM-based watermarking method has been
proposed in this paper. It provides higher robustness under
AWGN and GA compared to other quantization methods.
The benefits of the method are due to the introduced
procedure of recovery after GA as well as new distribution
of quantized samples with IDL.
For the new distribution of quantized samples there is
no symmetry inside embedding interval. The nonsymmet-
ric distribution of quantized samples is exploited by the
introduced procedure of recovery after GA. Two different
criteria are proposed to be used within the procedure. During
experiment it has been confirmed that the procedure is
computationally light and efficient.
In addition to the new kind of distribution of quantized
samples, the proposed QIM-based method benefits from
IDL. Utilization of IDL can reduce embedding distortions
introduced to a host signal. This is done by letting some
watermark bits to be interpreted incorrectly during embed-
ding and before any attack occurs. A model that describes
quantization process assumes that IDL can be implemented
in two different ways depending on the logical value of
parameterΩ.The proposed realization of IDL is beneficial for
anyΩ under highly intensive AWGN attack. However, “false”
value of Ω provides slightly higher robustness compared to
“true.”
Considerable performance improvements are due to the
abovementioned advancements. The amount of information
extracted (using hard decision decoder) under AWGN is at
the same or of a higher level compared to DC-QIM. Usage of
IDL is the most advantageous under AWGN for WNRs close
to −12 dB, where it performs up to 104 times better than DC-
QIM. Under GA, the performance of the proposed method
is up to 103 times higher than that of RDM. Finally, visual
quality degradation caused by the proposed quantization
method was also estimated in a subjective way by a group of
medical imaging experts. It was confirmed that as a result of
watermarking, important diagnostic characteristics did not
change.
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Nomenclature
𝑖: Unique integer index for each particular
sample
Σ: Random variable for the domain of
original samples
𝜍: Particular realization of Σ
Δ: The length of embedding interval
𝑙
𝑘
Δ
: The left endpoint of 𝑘th embedding
interval
𝑋: Random variable for the domain of
original samples inside embedding
interval
𝑥: Particular realization of𝑋
𝑋
󸀠: Random variable for the domain of
quantized samples inside embedding
interval
𝑥
󸀠: Particular realization of𝑋󸀠
Σ
󸀠: Random variable for the domain of
quantized samples
𝜍
󸀠: Particular realization of Σ󸀠
𝑓0(𝑥
󸀠
), 𝑓1(𝑥
󸀠
): Truncated distributions for quantized
samples inside embedding interval
𝛼, 𝛽,𝜏, 𝑐, 𝑔: Parameters of 𝑓0(𝑥
󸀠
), 𝑓1(𝑥
󸀠
)
𝛾0, 𝜗0, 𝜑1, 𝜂1: Fractions of samples that are labeled as
non-IDL0, IDL0, non-IDL1, and IDL1,
respectively
Δ̃: The length of embedding interval that is
required for watermark extraction after
GA
Δ̃
󸀠: Uniformly sampled guessed values of Δ̃
Δ̃
󸀠󸀠: Best-fit value from {Δ̃󸀠} according to the
estimator
Σ
󸀠
𝑛
(or Σ̇󸀠): Random variable for the domain of
quantized samples affected by attack/noise
𝜍
󸀠
𝑛
: Particular realization of Σ󸀠
𝑛
𝑋
󸀠
𝑛
(or ?̇?󸀠): Random variable for the domain of noisy
quantized samples inside embedding
interval
𝑥
󸀠
𝑛
: Particular realization of𝑋󸀠
𝑛
𝜔: Parameter of quantization model
E: The set of𝑋
E0, E1: Two disjoint subsets of E defined by
𝛾0 + 𝜗0 and 𝜑1 + 𝜂1, respectively
E󸀠: The set of𝑋󸀠
E󸀠
0
, E󸀠
1
: Two disjoint subsets of E󸀠
𝑋E
0
: Random variable from E0
𝑋E
1
: Random variable from E1
𝑋
󸀠
E󸀠
0
: Random variable from E󸀠
0
𝑋
󸀠
E󸀠
1
: Random variable from E󸀠
1
𝑓E
0
(𝑥): PDF of𝑋E
0
𝑓E
1
(𝑥): PDF of𝑋E
1
𝑓E󸀠
0
(𝑥
󸀠
): PDF of𝑋󸀠E󸀠
0
𝑓E󸀠
1
(𝑥
󸀠
): PDF of𝑋󸀠E󸀠
1
Th: The threshold used by the detector
́Th: The normalized threshold used by the
detector, for example, ́Th = Th/Δ
Z: Decision region “0” for the detector
O: Decision region “1” for the detector
Σ̇
󸀠
0
: The set of all the elements of E󸀠
0
influenced
by an attack
Σ̇
󸀠
1
: The set of all the elements of E󸀠
1
influenced
by an attack
IDL0, NIDL0: Two disjoint subsets of E0, defined by 𝜗0
and 𝛾0, respectively
IDL1, NIDL1: Two disjoint subsets of E1, defined by 𝜂1
and 𝜑1, respectively
Ě
󸀠
0
, Ê󸀠
0
: Two disjoint subsets of E󸀠
0
, defined by 𝛾0
and 𝜗0, respectively
Ě
󸀠
1
, Ê󸀠
1
: Two disjoint subsets of E󸀠
1
, defined by 𝜂1
and 𝜑1, respectively
?̌?0: Embedding distortion necessary to
transform NIDL0 to Ě
󸀠
0
?̌?1: Embedding distortion necessary to
transform IDL1 to Ě
󸀠
1
?̂?0: Embedding distortion necessary to
transform IDL0 to Ê
󸀠
0
?̂?1: Embedding distortion necessary to
transform NIDL1 to Ê
󸀠
1
BER0: Bit Error Rate for E󸀠0
BER1: Bit Error Rate for E󸀠1
𝐶: Maximized mutual information between
embedded and detected messages.
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